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Abstract  
As at the end of 2012, more than 600 nonstate-owned Chinese firms were listed in overseas stock markets. We 
find that Chinese firms listed in the US have the lowest cost of capital when compared to those listed in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, and these results hold when controlling for firm characteristics and the endogeneity of 
listing locations. Cross-sectional tests indicate that listing in the US is more beneficial to those firms which 
face higher information asymmetry and agency costs. Overall, our evidence supports the view that the 
institutional environment has a first-order impact on a firm’s cost of capital. 
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Classical finance theory assumes that firm owners (shareholders and debtholders) have indisputable claims to 
their firms’ future cash flows (Modigliani and Miller 1958). Most early studies in the literature focus on the 
cash flow rights allocated by securities, with much less emphasis on the control rights embedded in these 
securities (La Porta et al. 1998). Modern finance theories view a firm as a nexus of various explicit and implicit 
contracts that define the rights of stakeholders (Hart 1995). In this view, investment opportunity is not the only 
factor determining a firm’s value, and various real-world frictions such as information asymmetry, uncertainty, 
and contract enforceability all matter, especially when investor protection is weak. For example, Jensen (1986) 
argues that managers have a tendency to overinvest in unprofitable projects in attempts to gain personal benefits; 
and Johnson et al. (2000) argue that large shareholders have incentives to engage in tunneling. Hence, the 
institutional environment in which a firm operates becomes an important factor in determining the firm’s value 
(La Porta et al. 1998). In this article, using overseas-listed Chinese firms as the sample, we examine the impact 
of listing locations on firms’ costs of capital. 
Almost all of the existing studies on overseas-listed firms focus on cross-listed firms (Chan, Wang, and Yang 
2013; Karolyi 1998, 2006; Liu and Wang 2018). Our sample is unique in the sense that most foreign-listed 
Chinese firms are listed only in a foreign market and not domestically.1 According to Li, Xie, and Wang (2012), 
there were only 85 cross-listed Chinese firms at the end of 2010, while 90% of the 287 non-Chinese foreign 
firms listed on the US market were also cross-listed in their domestic markets.2 It is important to note that cross-
listed firms are inherently different from firms that are only listed overseas. Stock prices of cross-listed firms 
are determined by both domestic and foreign investors as a result of arbitrage forces and shared information 
discovery (Gagnon and Karolyi 2010), whereas the prices of stocks that are only listed overseas are determined 
solely by foreign investors. Foreign investors are less informed about overseas-listed firms than are domestic 
investors (Chan, Menkveld, and Yang 2007, 2008), and increased information acquisition costs for foreign  
investors can lead to an inferior information environment and depressed firm value (Li et al. 2013).
Mukherjee (2012) finds that corporate governance mechanisms are effective only when the cost of
information acquisition is low. The effects of cross listing on firm value may not, however, be
applicable to single-listing cases. Our article fills this gap by empirically examining the impact of
overseas listing locations on the cost of capital. In addition, most of the studies in this area focus on
firms listed in the US and examine whether the institutional environments of their domestic markets
matter. Our article keeps the domestic market the same in order to more closely examine whether the
institutional environment of the listing location matters.
We focus on the three overseas markets in which most overseas-listed Chinese firms are listed: the
US, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Our results show that Chinese firms have lower costs of capital when
they are listed in the US than when they are listed in Hong Kong or Singapore. Our results are robust
after we control for the systematic differences among firms listed in different locations, and for the
endogeneity of the listing locations. In addition, we find that US-listed firms experience a more
pronounced reduction in costs of capital when they face higher ex ante information asymmetry and
higher ex ante agency costs. Our evidence supports the premise that the better institutional environ-
ment and information disclosure which are present in the US market mitigates information asymmetry
and agency problems. The evidence documented in this article is consistent with our hypothesis that
the institutional environment is an important factor affecting firms’ costs of capital. Our article thus
improves our understanding of the decisions of firms to go public in overseas markets, complements
the existing studies on overseas listing, and contributes to the debate on whether listing in another
market reduces a firm’s cost of capital (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004; Sarkissian and Schill 2009).
In this article, in addition to the widely used method of backing out firms’ costs of capital from
analysts’ earnings forecasts, we also employ a new method as proposed by Hou, Dijk, and Zhang
(2012). This new approach does not rely on analysts’ earnings forecasts, and is therefore more flexible
and less fraught with the various issues which arise from using analysts’ forecast data (Easton and
Monahan 2005; Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 2001; Guay, Kothari, and Shu 2011). Various
studies in the literature have proposed many different methods for calculating the implied cost of
capital. To ensure that the results in this study are not sensitive to the specifications of these models,
we follow Hou, Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and investigate five different models: Claus and Thomas
(2001); Easton (2004); Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); Gordon and Gordon (1997); and
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). For each of these five models, we calculate two implied cost of
capital measures: one based on analysts’ forecast data, and one based on the method proposed by Hou,
Dijk, and Zhang (2012). In most of the analyses, our results are based on the average of these 10 costs
of capital measures.3
Our article contributes to the literature on overseas listing. Although there have been many studies
on cross listing, the amount of literature on firms that are only listed in a foreign market is small. Blass
and Yafeh (2001) study the factors that motivated Israeli firms to list in the US, and find that high-
quality innovative firms are willing to incur the additional costs associated with listing in the US in
order to signal their quality. Sun, Tong, and Wu (2013) examine 92 state-owned Chinese firms listed in
Hong Kong and find that these firms can leverage on the better governance environment of Hong
Kong. Hornstein (2014) studies Chinese firms listed in the US, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the UK.
They find that the local institutional environment of these firms affects their choice of listing location.
Our study contributes to this small but growing literature and furthers our understanding of how
foreign listing locations can affect firms’ costs of capital.
Institutional barriers are the main factor leading to Chinese firms choosing to raise equity capital in
foreign stock markets. Nonstate-owned Chinese firms are discriminated against in the domestic capital
markets (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005; Brandt and Li 2003). For these firms, going public in foreign
stock markets becomes an appealing alternative. Since the first Chinese firm, Qiaoxing Universal
Telephone, listed on NASDAQ on February 17, 1999, more than 600 nonstate-owned Chinese firms
have chosen to list in foreign stock markets. The number of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) in
overseas markets remained notable, with 75 and 59 in 2011 and 2012, respectively—a period when
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Chinese stocks were shunned by foreign investors due to a series of accounting scandals and a general
distrust of Chinese firms. We expect that overseas stock markets will continue to be among the most
important sources of external capital for nonstate-owned Chinese firms as financial discrimination
against these firms in their domestic market will not disappear quickly. By documenting the institu-
tional differences of various overseas markets and their impacts on firms’ costs of capital, our article
may also provide some guidance for firms on overseas listing location choices.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and
develops our main hypotheses; Section 3 introduces our measures of implied costs of capital; Section 4
describes the data and presents empirical results; and in the final section, we present our conclusions.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Asset pricing theories, such as the capital asset pricing model, prescribe that a stock’s expected return
is determined solely by its systematic risk, which is measured as its return covariance with the market.
Subsequent studies, however, find that a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms could also affect its
cost of capital. The institutional environment affects not only the corporate governance mechanisms a
firm chooses but could also influence its cost of capital through its interactions with its governance
environment. In this section, we briefly review relevant literature and develop our hypotheses.
Literature Review
Listing locations affect firms’ costs of capital because they affect the corporate governance environ-
ment that firms face. We therefore break the review into two subsections: in Section 2.1.1 we review
the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital; and in Section 2.1.2
we review the literature on the relationship between institutional environment (which is determined by
listing location) and corporate governance. These reviews will pave the way for our hypotheses
development in Section 2.2.
Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital
Contract theory views a firm as a nexus of various explicit or implicit contracts, which specify the
rights and duties of various stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders, and firm managers. Since
contracts are typically incomplete, conflicts of interest among principals and agents will inevitably
arise (Hart 1995). In this article, we study firms’ costs of equity capital. Therefore, we focus mainly on
the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, as well as those between large controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders.
As the agents of shareholders, corporate managers’ incentives may not be perfectly aligned with
those of the shareholders. First, managers must incur personal cost (i.e., effort) to generate profits to be
shared with shareholders, and they have less incentive to work hard when their effort is difficult to
observe and monitor. In other words, managers tend to shirk when their efforts are not contractible.
Using the staggered passage of antitakeover laws in different states of the US as a natural experiment,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that managers exert less effort after the passage of antitake-
over laws because the likelihood of firms being acquired is reduced and, therefore, managers face less
threat from the takeover market. Specifically, they found the shirking result after the passage of
antitakeover laws, after worker pay rises were enacted, and when the destruction of old plants and the
creation of new plants to replace them failed. Furthermore, they found that productivity and profit-
ability declined in response to the passage of these laws.
Second, managers have a tendency to increase firm size and invest in value-destroying projects
rather than distribute cash to shareholders in the form of dividends (Jensen 1986). This is because
managers’ personal benefits increase with firm size (Gabaix and Landier 2008). Blanchard, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) found that, when firms acquire large cash windfalls from lawsuits, they
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tend to use it for investment or increase cash holding, rather than distribute the cash back to
shareholders.
Conflicts of interest between large and minority shareholders often take the form of tunneling.
Generally speaking, large shareholders have control rights and discretion over the daily operations of
firms. Enormous empirical studies have found that large shareholders tend to use their control rights to
obtain personal benefits (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Zingales 1994). There are many different ways to
do this, such as via related party transactions (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006) and perquisite
consumption (Chen, Chen, and Hui 2009).
Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and between large shareholders and
minority shareholders, arise as a result of the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen
1983). This separation creates adverse incentives for those with control rights to pursue goals which
benefit themselves. Anticipating this tendency, shareholders will naturally increase the required rates
of return on capital (Hart and Moore 1998; Jensen 1986; Lin et al. 2011; Stulz 1990).
Institutional Environment and Corporate Governance
The literature has proposed many ways to solve, or at least mitigate, the principal–agent problem. First,
more intensive monitoring of corporate managers through board of directors, security analysts, financial
journalists, or institutional investors could reduce agency costs (Yermack 1996). Second, improved
alignment of the interests of agents and principals may be achieved by adjusting how the profits are
shared; the performance sensitive compensation contract is one example of this kind of adjustment
(Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Third, increased punishment for managers engaging in opportunistic behaviors
may mitigate the problem. Fourth, more effective governance mechanisms could be achieved by improv-
ing the information environments of firms; for example, requiring firms to make higher quality disclosures
more frequently would improve the information environment (Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva 2006).
Well-functioning institutional environments could reduce firms’ agency costs by facilitating the
adoption of various corporate governance mechanisms as mentioned above. For example, well-
developed financial markets generally have more experienced financial analysts, more skilled
journalists, and more mature institutional investors, all of whom could help monitor firm managers
more effectively. At the same time, a good legal system could increase the probability of detection
and punishment for managers who commit crimes, thereby discouraging managers’ opportunistic
behavior. With more stringent information disclosure requirements, shareholders will be more
knowledgeable about their firms and monitoring will be more effective, which also mitigates
agency costs.
On the empirical side, Sun, Tong, and Wu (2013) document that listing in the more developed
Hong Kong market increased mainland Chinese firms’ valuations. Hornstein (2014) finds that the local
institutional environment can predict Chinese firms’ performance, at least shortly after their IPOs.
Across domestically listed Chinese firms, corporate governance also has a significant effect on
earnings management (Liu and Lu 2007) and related party transactions (Jian and Wong 2010).
Although these articles have not tested how the foreign listing location affects a firm’s cost of capital,
they do provide insights into how the institutional environment affects a firm’s corporate governance,
therefore providing a foundation for our hypotheses.
Hypotheses Development
A publicly listed firm is obliged to satisfy all listing requirements, and exposes itself to continuous
monitoring from various market participants. Relative to the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore, main-
land China’s institutional environments are weaker in terms of investor protection and information
disclosure. Therefore, being listed overseas in these markets can expose Chinese firms to better
institutional environments and improve their corporate governance standards, thereby reducing their
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costs of capital (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999). Different overseas markets have different institutional
environments and possibly also different effects on firms’ costs of capital.
The aggregate size of the three markets referred to above differs dramatically. Based on data from
the World Bank, as at the end of 2012, the total market capitalization of all firms listed in Hong Kong
and Singapore was US$1.11 trillion and US$0.41 trillion, respectively, with a figure of US$18.67
trillion for the US market. In other words, total market capitalization of the US is 17 times that of
Hong Kong and 45 times that of Singapore.4 Additionally, although all three economies are developed,
share common legal origins, and enjoy highly effective law enforcement systems, the US market is
more remarkable in many dimensions.
First, the US scores higher than Hong Kong and Singapore in most institutional quality measures. (1)
The US scores 10 out of 10 for rule of law, while Hong Kong and Singapore score 8.22 and 8.57,
respectively (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) found that the year during
which insider trading law was first practiced and enforced in a country/economy is a good measure for
insider trading regulation. The US enforced its insider trading law in 1961, while both Hong Kong and
Singapore enforced against insider trading much later, in 1994 and 1978, respectively. (2) The frequency
of insider trading prosecutions is much lower in Hong Kong and Singapore than in the US. (3) The US
market outperforms Hong Kong and Singapore based on other widely used measures of institutional
quality. For example, the risk of expropriation is lower in the US with a score of 9.98, and with scores of
8.29 and 9.30 for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). The US has
better control over corruption than Hong Kong and Singapore, with corresponding scores of 8.63, 8.52,
and 8.22, respectively. In terms of political rights, the US also has a much higher score of 7.00 than
Hong Kong and Singapore, with corresponding scores of 1.86 and 3.00, respectively.
Second, the three markets also differ significantly in terms of their information environments.
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) rank 34 countries based on their accounting transparency.
The US ranks first, while the ranking for Hong Kong and Singapore are 21 and 22, respectively. In
addition, the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore score 97.83, 69.57, and 63.77, respectively, in terms of
the timeliness of accounting reporting (Saudagaran and Diga 2000). The average number of analysts
following a firm is 30.23, 25, and 20.9 in the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore, respectively (Chang,
Khanna, and Palepu 2000). The degree of media development and freedom of press could also affect
how easily investors obtain access to unbiased and timely information, hence affecting a firm’s
information environment. The scores for freedom of press are 8.67, 6.84, and 3.50 for the US,
Hong Kong, and Singapore, respectively (Qi, Roth, and Wald 2010). In terms of media development,
the US scores 86.72, while Hong Kong and Singapore score 87.44 and 83.72, respectively.
Overall, US capital markets enjoy a significantly better institutional environment than do the capital
markets of Hong Kong and Singapore, while the differences between the capital markets of Hong
Kong and Singapore are minimal.
The above discussions lead to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms listed in the US should have lower costs of capital than firms listed in Hong
Kong and Singapore.
The institutional environment has differential impacts on different types of firms. Firms facing more
severe information asymmetry and agency problems should domestically benefit more from listing in a
market that offers a better institutional environment. Miller (1999) studied market reactions to firms
cross listing their shares in the US via American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and found that the US
market reactions were more favorable for firms from countries with inferior institutional environments.
In addition to testing Hypothesis 1, we further classify firms into different groups based on measures
of information asymmetry and agency problems, and examine whether listing locations impact
different firms in different ways:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms facing higher ex ante costs of information asymmetry and agency problems
should benefit more from listing in the US. In other words, US-listed Chinese firms should experience
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larger reductions in costs of capital compared to those listed in Hong Kong and Singapore when they have
higher ex ante information asymmetry and agency problems.
Hypothesis 2 is a natural extension of Hypothesis 1. Testing Hypothesis 2 could also improve our
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of listing locations on firms’ costs of capital.
Measuring Cost of Capital
The traditional measure of cost of capital (expected return) is ex-post realized returns averaged over a sample
period (Fama and French 1992). However, Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) argue that using ex-post
realized returns as a proxy for expected returns results in large measurement errors, especially when the
sample period is not sufficiently long. In this article, we use the implied cost of capital measures estimated by
equating current stock prices to discounted future earnings. We briefly introduce each model in this section5.
According to the dividend discount model, stock price is equal to the present value of all future
expected cash flows:
Pt ¼
X1
i¼1
EtðDtþiÞ
ð1þ RÞi (1)
In model (1), Pt is stock price at time t, Dt is t period’s dividend, Et is the expectation with respect to
all information up to time t, and R is the expected cost of capital at time t.
According to Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), when clean surplus accounting holds, we
can rewrite model (1) as follows:
Pt ¼ Bt þ
X1
i¼1
EtðNItþi  RBtþi1Þ
ð1þ RÞi
¼ Bt þ
X1
i¼1
Et½ðROEtþi  RÞBtþi1
ð1þ RÞi
; (2)
where Bt is the firm’s book value of equity at time t, NIt is net income at time t, and ROEt is return on
equity at time t.
In model (2), Pt is observable, but the future values of ROE and B are not; therefore, they must be
estimated based on some forecasting methods. Models of implied cost of capital differ by their
assumptions about the future ROE and B.
The Gordon and Gordon (1997) model is the simplest among all the models of estimating implied
cost of capital:
Pt ¼ EtðROEtþ1
BtÞ
R
(3)
This model essentially assumes that dividend growth rate in model (1) is 0, and the forecasted dividend
at time t + 1 is all we need to estimate implied cost of capital.
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) assume that the firm stops growing after 12 periods. Their
model could be written as follows:
Pt ¼ Bt þ
X11
i¼1
Et½ðROEtþi  RÞBtþi1
ð1þ RÞi þ
Et½ðROE12  RÞBtþ11
Rð1þ RÞ11 (4)
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Claus and Thomas (2001) assume that a firm begins to maintain a constant growth rate of g starting
from period 5. Their model is as follows:
Pt ¼ Bt þ
X5
i¼1
Et½ðROEtþi  RÞBtþi1
ð1þ RÞi þ
Et½ðROE5  RÞBtþ11ð1þ gÞ
ðR gÞð1þ RÞ5 (5)
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004) derive the following equation:
Pt ¼ EPStþ1R þ
EPSTþ2 þ RDPStþ1  ð1þ RÞEPStþ1
RðR ΔagrÞ (6)
where EPS is the firm’s earnings per share, DPS is the firm’s dividend per share, and agr is the
abnormal growth in earnings, which is defined as the difference between accounting earnings at time
t + 2 and expected earnings at t + 1.
Based on model (6), Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) propose a different
model to calculate cost of capital. Specifically, Easton (2004) assumes Δagr = 0, which leads to the
following equation:
Pt ¼ EPSTþ2 þ R
DPStþ1  ð1þ RÞEPStþ1
R2
(7)
Different from the assumption that Δagr = 0 made by Easton (2004), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005) assume a long-run positive growth rate for firms. Derivation of model (6) based on this
assumption shows the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model of implied cost of capital:
R ¼ Aþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A2 þ EPStþ1ðg2ΔagrÞPt
q
A ¼ 12 ½Δagr þ DPStþ1P 
g2 ¼ EPStþ2EPStþ1EPStþ1
(8)
To simplify analysis, we refer to the above-cited measures of cost of capital as the GG, GLS, CT,
Easton, and OJ models. In applying these methods, we have to make additional assumptions.
Following these studies, we also make the following standard assumptions when analyzing our data:
1. Clean surplus accounting holds.
2. We assume that firms have the same payout ratio as prior periods. If current earnings are less
than 0, we use current dividends divided by 0.06 times total assets as proxy for dividend payout
ratio.
3. For the GLS model, we assume a firm’s forecasted ROE will mean revert to the median ROE of
its industry after t + 3. We use the data of the Chinese firms listed in the A share market to
calculate the median ROE for each industry.
4. The g in the CT model and the Δagr in the OJ model are set to a risk-free rate minus 3%. We use
5-year deposit rates in China as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
5. To ensure that all the accounting information is publicly available when we calculate cost of
capital, we align accounting variables at the end of fiscal year t-1 with stock price data at the end
of June in year t.
We need earnings forecasts as inputs for the model to estimate cost of capital. Most existing studies
use analyst forecasted earnings as inputs. More recently, Hou, Dijk, and Zhang (2012) developed a
new approach to estimating future cash flows from cross-sectional regressions. This method could
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eliminate some issues arising from the use of analyst forecasted earnings, such as analysts’ optimism
bias and their slow incorporation of new information. There are two steps in the use of this forecasting
model.
In the first step, we estimate the coefficients of the following model using accounting data from the
prior 10 years:
Ei;tþτ ¼ α0;τ þ α1;τAi;t þ α2;τDi;t þ α3;τDDi;t þ α4;τEi;t þ α5;τNegEi;t þ α6;τACi;t þ εi;tþτ (9)
Ei,t+τ is the firm’s earnings at year t + τ. Following Hou, Dijk, and Zhang (2012), we choose τ ϵ (1, 2,
3, 4, 5) and estimate the five models separately. Ai,t is the firm’s total assets, Di,t is dividend, DDi,t is a
dummy variable indicating positive dividend at year t, Ei,t is earnings, measured as net income before
extraordinary items, NegEi,t is a dummy variable indicating negative earnings, and ACi,t is accrual.
Accrual is defined as changes in noncash current assets minus changes in current liability (excluding
the current portion of long-term liability), minus depreciation and amortization expenses, and finally
adding back changes from deferred taxes (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003).
For any given year t and forecast horizon τ, we estimate a set of coefficients from model (9). The
forecasted earnings for horizon τ are follows:
EtðEtþτÞ ¼ α̂0;τ þ α̂1;τAi;t þ α̂2;τDi;t þ α̂3;τDDi;t þ α̂4;τEi;t þ α̂5;τNegEi;t þ α̂6;τACi;t (10)
A further advantage of using Hou, Dijk, and Zhang’s (2012) method to forecast future earnings is that we
could increase our sample size, since this method does not require a firm to have analyst forecast data.
In total, we used five models to calculate firms’ implied costs of capital, and for each model we
used both analyst-based and model-based earnings forecasts as inputs for the model; therefore, we had
10 measures of cost of capital6. Easton and Monahan (2005) and Hou, Dijk, and Zhang (2012) argue
that implied cost of capital estimated by equating stock price to discounted future cash flows has
measurement errors. To reduce the impact of measurement errors on our results, we used the average
value of the 10 costs of capital estimates as our main dependent variable.7
Sample, Research Design, and Results
Data Description
We collected the list of Chinese firms listed in the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore from Wind.8 Wind is a
widely used data vendor, specialized in collecting financial information from China’s financial market, and
is similar to Bloomberg, which is widely used in the Western world. We checked the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange website, the Singapore Stock Exchange website, and the ADR database of JP Morgan to ensure
that our list of overseas-listing Chinese firms was accurate and complete. Chinese firms are defined as those
with most of their operations in mainland China at the time the firm enters the database, and which are
managed by current or former Chinese citizens.9 We obtained firms’ ownership data from the Datastream/
Worldscope company websites and annual reports. Since nonstate-owned firms are not comparable to state-
owned firms, we removed from our sample all firms with more than 50% state ownership.10 Cross-listed
firms were also removed from our sample as they are affected by institutional factors in multiple locations.
Accounting variables, stock price, and exchange rate data were downloaded from Datastream/Worldscope.
Analyst forecast data used were from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System. The sample period was
from 2000 to 2012 as there were few overseas-listed Chinese firms prior to 2000, and the data coverage for
that time period is also poor. We used year-end exchange rates to convert all our variables into US dollars.
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Model Specification
We used the following regression model to compare the cost of capital for firms listed in Hong Kong,
Singapore, and the US:
Ri;t ¼ β0 þ β1USi þ β2SGXi þ β3Betai;t1 þ β4Sizei;t1 þ β5Agei;t1 þ β6MBi;t1 þ β7Leveragei;t1
þ β8R Di;t1 þ β9IVi;t1 þ β10Runupi;t1 þ β11Followingi;t1 þ ε
(11)
Ri,t is the estimated cost of capital for firm i at year t. We used the stock price at the end of June of
year t and accounting data at the end of fiscal year t–1 to estimate the cost of capital. US and SGX
are two dummy variables where US (SGX) is equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the US (Singapore),
and is 0 otherwise. The control variables are lagged by 1 year. In regressions with control
variables, firms that conducted their foreign IPOs in 2012 will not be in our sample due to missing
control variables.
We also controlled for other firm characteristics that may affect firms’ costs of capital.11 IV is a
stock’s idiosyncratic volatility and Runup is a stock’s cumulative returns. We used 12-month daily
return data from July of year t-1 to June of year t to calculate Beta, IV, and Runup.12 Size, Age, MB,
Leverage, and R&D are the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm, the number of years the
firm has been listed, the market-to-book ratio, the leverage ratio, and R&D expenses, respectively.
Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets, and R&D is calculated as R&D expenses
over total assets. All five variables are calculated based on accounting data from fiscal year t-1.
Following is the number of analysts following a firm.
After we deleted the firm-years for which we were unable to reliably estimate Ri,t (due to missing
data or nonconvergence of the model), 1043 observations remained. There were 218, 576, and 249
observations, and 64, 78, and 59 unique firms listed in the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore,
respectively. The data used was a standard panel dataset. Simple OLS estimation may lead to under-
estimation of standard errors of the coefficients; therefore, we followed Petersen (2009) and clustered
standard errors in two dimensions: year and industry, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC
code level.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. Firms listed in the three markets are quite similar in terms of
market beta, firm size, age, and idiosyncratic volatility. For example, firms from all three markets have
betas close to 1, with firms listed in the US having betas slightly above 1, and firms in Hong Kong and
Singapore having betas of around 0.86. The average firm size was 14.114 for firms listed in the US,
13.704 for those in Hong Kong, and 13.063 for those in Singapore. On average, firms had been listed
for 6 years in the three markets at the time of the study. Firms listed in Hong Kong had the lowest
idiosyncratic volatility, with that of firms in the Singapore and US markets of around 4%.
Notable differences in leverage, Runup, market-to-book ratio (MB), R&D, and analyst coverage
exist among firms listed in the three markets. US-listed firms had the lowest leverage ratio of 35.7%,
while Hong Kong-listed firms had the highest leverage ratio of 46.8%, and for firms listed in
Singapore the leverage ratio was 37.9%. US-listed stocks had average Runup of 0.486, while it was
0.216 for firms listed in Hong Kong and 0.006 for firms listed in Singapore. This was mainly due to
the outperformance of the US stock market over the Hong Kong and Singapore markets during our
sample period. Similarly, firms listed in the US had the highest MB of 2.942, while those listed in
Hong Kong and Singapore had MBs of around 1.8. US-listed firms had the highest R&D expenses at
1.735% of total assets, while this number was only 0.349% and 0.372% for firms listed in Hong Kong
and Singapore, respectively. In addition, Hong Kong-listed firms attracted more analyst coverage
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overall—1.830 analysts on average—while analyst following was only 1.468 and 0.699 for firms
listed in the US and Singapore, respectively.
Overall, the firms listed in the three markets were quite similar, although some firm characteristics
did differ from location to location. In our subsequent analysis, we will explain how we carefully
controlled for the effect of different firm characteristics on our results.
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the main variables used in this article. The correlation
between US, SGX, and firm characteristics are quite similar to the summary statistics reported in
Table 1. Overall, we did not find particularly high correlations among the variables in Table 2.
Multicollinearity has a limited impact on our results.
Univariate Analysis
Table 3 reports the univariate analysis of cost of capital for firms listed in the US, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. We used five different models to estimate cost of capital and two measures of earnings
forecast, so we have a total of 10 measures of cost of capital. We report the mean cost of capital estimated
from each model for firms in the three markets separately, and also the cost of capital measure averaged
across 10 models in Table 3. We test whether the differences in cost of capital for firms listed in the three
markets are statistically significant, indicated by * in the columns of US and SGX.
From the univariate analysis, we found that US-listed Chinese firms have the lowest cost of capital,
and this remained true irrespective of which model we used to estimate cost of capital. We also found that
firms listed in Hong Kong tended to have lower costs of capital than those listed in Singapore, but that in
the GG-analysts specification, this was reversed (although statistically insignificant). Because firms
listed in the three markets are systematically different from one another in some characteristics, we next
conducted multivariate regression analysis to systematically examine the relationship between firms’
listing locations and costs of capital. To reduce the impact of measurement errors, we used the cost of
capital measure averaged across the 10 models as the dependent variable in the regression analysis.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
US HK SGX
Number of firms 64 78 59
Number of observations 218 576 249
Beta 1.167 0.860 0.866
Size 14.114 13.704 13.063
Age 6.335 5.757 6.410
IV (%) 3.963 3.367 3.949
Leverage 0.357 0.468 0.379
Runup 0.486 0.216 0.006
MB 2.942 1.773 1.751
R&D (%) 1.735 0.349 0.327
Following 1.468 1.830 0.699
This table reports the summary statistics of our sample. We report the summary statistics by firms’ listing locations: the
United State (US), Hong Kong (HK), and Singapore (SGX). The first two rows report the number of unique firms in
each location, and the number of firm-year observations in each location. Beta is a stock’s sensitivity to the market
returns. We calculate it based on daily return data from July of year t-1 to June of year t. IV is stock’s idiosyncratic
volatility and Runup is a stock’s cumulative returns. Both are also calculated based on data from July of year t-1 to June
of year t. Size, Age, MB, Leverage, and R&D are the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, the number of years the
firm has been listed, the market-to-book ratio, the leverage ratio, and the R&D expenses, respectively. Leverage is
calculated as total debt divided by total assets; R&D is R&D expenses over total assets. All five variables are calculated
based on accounting data from fiscal year t-1. Following is the number of analysts following a firm. The sample period is
from 2000 to 2012.
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Regression Analysis
Table 4 reports our main results concerning the effect of listing location on firms’ costs of capital. In
column (1), we only included two dummy variables, US and SGX, without any controls or industry/
year fixed effects. The coefficient of US is −0.050 with a t-stat of −3.22, which is significant at the 1%
level. This means that firms listed in the US have a significantly lower cost of capital than those listed
Table 2. Correlation matrix.
US SGX Beta Size Age IV Leverage Runup MB R&D Following
US 1
SGX −0.29 1
Beta 0.25 −0.07 1
Size 0.14 −0.18 0.20 1
Age 0.03 0.04 −0.04 0.26 1
IV 0.10 0.11 0.09 −0.38 −0.17 1
Leverage −0.17 −0.12 0.03 0.28 0.13 −0.02 1
Runup 0.14 −0.12 −0.01 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.04 1
MB 0.22 −0.07 0.21 0.07 0.02 −0.02 0.12 0.35 1
R&D 0.35 −0.11 0.17 −0.11 −0.02 0.04 −0.14 0.04 0.07 1
Following 0.00 −0.16 0.02 0.15 0.08 −0.05 −0.02 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 1
This table reports the correlation matrix of the variables in our sample. US is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for
firms listed in the US and 0 otherwise. SGX is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for firms listed in Singapore and 0
otherwise. Beta is a stock’s sensitivity to market returns. We calculate it based on daily return data from July of year t-1
to June of year t. IV is stock’s idiosyncratic volatility and Runup is a stock’s cumulative returns. Both are also calculated
based on data from July of year t-1 to June of year t. Size, Age, MB, Leverage, and R&D are the natural logarithm of
firm’s total assets, the number of years the firm has been listed, the market-to-book ratio, the leverage ratio, and the R&D
expenses, respectively. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets; R&D is R&D expenses over total
assets. All five variables are calculated based on accounting data from fiscal year t-1. Following is the number of analysts
following a firm. The sample period is from 2000 to 2012.
Table 3. Overseas listing location and cost of capital: Univariate analysis.
Cost of capital model Earnings forecast model US HK SGX
GG Analyst forecast 16.76*** 23.62 23.00
Hou, Dijk, and Zhang 12.76*** 22.31 19.53
GLS Analyst forecast 11.88* 16.06 17.00
Hou, Dijk, and Zhang 9.83** 12.32 16.45**
CT Analyst forecast 11.21 14.67 19.73**
Hou, Dijk, and Zhang 7.56* 9.53 13.65*
EASTON Analyst forecast 7.38 8.85 13.57**
Hou, Dijk, and Zhang 13.17** 18.34 17.86
OJ Analyst forecast 12.18*** 21.00 29.20**
Hou, Dijk, and Zhang 10.90 12.89 25.91***
Average 10.02*** 15.04 20.14**
This table compares cost of capital for the three markets: the United State (US), Hong Kong (HK), and Singapore (SGX),
respectively. We calculate cost of capital using five different models, and for each model, we have two ways to estimate
future earnings. In total, we have 10 costs of capital measures. For details, please see Section 3. The * for US indicates
whether it is significantly different from HK, and the * for SGX indicates whether it is significantly different from HK. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Cost of capital is reported as a percentage.
The sample period is from 2000 to 2012.
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in Hong Kong. The coefficient of SGX is 0.051 with a t-stat of 2.51, which is significant at the 5%
level, meaning that firms listed in Singapore have significantly higher costs of capital than those listed
in Hong Kong. The coefficient on the intercept term in column (1) is the cost of capital estimated for
Hong Kong-listed firms, and this number is 0.150. The average cost of capital for firms listed in the
US and Singapore could be estimated from the coefficients of US and SGX. As can be seen, the cost
of capital on average is 10.0% and 20.1% for firms listed in the US and Singapore, respectively, which
is consistent with what we find from the univariate analysis in Table 3.
In column (2), we add industry fixed effects (we use two-digit SIC codes to classify industries) and
year fixed effects to control for the effects of industry differences and macroeconomic factors. The
Table 4. Overseas listing location and cost of capital: Multivariate analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US −0.050*** −0.061*** −0.056*** −0.069***
(−3.22) (−3.38) (−3.05) (−4.33)
SGX 0.051** 0.043* 0.057** 0.062**
(2.15) (1.95) (2.28) (2.32)
Beta −0.014 −0.013
(−1.15) (−1.25)
Size 0.014** 0.023***
(2.47) (3.52)
Age −0.003** −0.001
(−2.04) (−0.75)
MB −0.007*** −0.008***
(−3.67) (−3.69)
Leverage −0.052 −0.006
(−1.15) (−0.12)
R&D 0.159 −0.107
(0.73) (−0.59)
IV 1.045*** 1.324***
(2.87) (4.53)
Runup −0.001 −0.005
(−0.20) (−0.98)
Following 0.001 0.000
(0.44) (0.01)
Constant 0.150*** 0.202*** −0.008 −0.195**
(12.55) (8.40) (−0.11) (−2.19)
Year No Yes No Yes
Industry No Yes No Yes
Adj-R2 0.046 0.157 0.078 0.176
N 1043 1038 945 941
This table reports the regression results. The dependent variable is cost of capital, which is the average of the 10 different
costs of capital variables used in this article. For details concerning these variables, please see Section 3. US is a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 for firms listed in the US and 0 otherwise. SGX is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for
firms listed in Singapore and 0 otherwise. Beta is a stock’s sensitivity to market returns. We calculate it based on daily
return data from July of year t-1 to June of year t. IV is stock’s idiosyncratic volatility and Runup is a stock’s cumulative
returns. Both are also calculated based on data from July of year t-1 to June of year t. Size, Age, MB, Leverage, and
R&D are the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, the number of years the firm has been listed, the market-to-book
ratio, the leverage ratio, and the R&D expenses, respectively. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets;
R&D is R&D expenses over total assets. All five variables are calculated based on accounting data from fiscal year t-1.
Following is the number of analysts following a firm. The sample period is from 2000 to 2012. All the standard errors are
clustered at two dimensions: industry and year. In some of the models, we also include industry and year fixed effects.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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results show that the coefficient of US changes from −0.05 to −0.061 and is still significant at the 1%
level, and that the coefficient of SGX changes from 0.051 to 0.043 and is significant at the 10% level.
We added more control variables in columns (3) and (4), and the coefficients of US and SGX were not
affected to any significant degree by these additional controls. The coefficient of MB is significantly
negative in column (3) and column (4), consistent with Tang, Wu, and Zhang’s (2014) findings on the
US market. The coefficient of IV in column (3) and column (4) is significantly positive, supporting the
view that idiosyncratic volatility tends to increases firms’ information asymmetry and agency costs.
The coefficient of Age in column (3) is significantly negative, suggesting that firms which have listed
for a longer time have lower costs of capital. However, the coefficient of Age is no longer significant
after controlling for industry and year fixed effects. We conjecture that this is due to the strong
correlation between year dummies and age. In untabulated results, the coefficient of Age is −0.003
(t = −1.76) without year fixed effects. This supports our hypothesis that firms enjoy lower costs of
capital when they have been listed for a longer time.
Table 1 shows that firms listed in the three markets are systematically different from one another
along some dimensions. To control for this, we added these firm characteristics in Table 4. In this
section, we further conduct robustness checks to rule out confounding effects of other firm character-
istics on our results. Many well-known Chinese high-tech firms are listed in US markets, including
Sina, Sohu, and Shanda, while there are few Chinese high-tech firms listed in Hong Kong and
Singapore. To ensure that our results were not driven solely by high-tech firms, we performed
regression analysis for nonhigh-tech13 and manufacturing firms separately. The results are reported
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, respectively. As can be seen, the coefficient of US remains
significantly negative. In column (2), we find that the coefficient of SGX is 0.036 with a t-stat of
0.48 after we restricted the sample to manufacturing firms. This means that the different costs of
capital among firms listed in Singapore and Hong Kong may be due to industry differences.
In the main test, we remove firms with more than 50% state ownership. In column (3), we remove
firms with any reported state ownership, irrespective of how minimal. We find that the results are not
sensitive to this filter. In column (4), we focus on the period after China entered the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In the pre-WTO period, overseas investors might have had greater difficulty in
understanding Chinese firms. This filter does not have much effect on the findings. In columns (5)–(8),
we split the sample into a few subperiods: 2000–2001 (the pre-WTO period), 2002–2007 (post-WTO
but before the financial crisis), 2008–2011 (the crisis period), and 2012 (the post-crisis period).
Column (9) reports the results for when we include the interaction terms between all the demeaned
control variables and US, as well as the interaction terms between all the demeaned control variables
and SGX. In this full interaction specification, the coefficients of the control variables can vary across
markets. The results show that the results are robust to these sensitivity tests.14
In addition to the above robustness checks, we also conducted regression analysis on a matched
sample. Specifically, for every firm i listed in Hong Kong, we selected a matched firm j listed in the
US and a matched firm k listed in Singapore, and we then conducted regression analysis on these
matched samples. We required the matched firm j (or k) to be in the same industry and same year as
firm i. In addition, we calculated a score between the two matched firms based on the following
equation:
Minj Scorei;j;t ¼
Sizei;t  Sizej;t
 
Sizei;t
þ Leveragei;t  Leveragej;t
 
Leveragei;t
(12)
For Singapore-listed firms, the score is defined by replacing subscript j with k.
To ensure that firms were comparable in the matched sample, we required the score to be less than a
certain threshold. We consider Score ≤ 0.2 and Score ≤ 0.4 in Table 6. The results show that the
coefficient of US is still significant under the 1% level and that the coefficient of SGX is insignif-
icantly positive in both specifications. When we compare the matched sample results (columns (1) and
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(2) in Table 6) with the full sample results (column (4) in Table 4), our results actually become
stronger.
We consider two other ways to deal with the endogeneity of firms’ listing locations: the Heckman
selection model and an instrumental variable approach. Results are reported in Table 6.
First, for the Heckman selection model, in the first stage we used firm size, leverage, R&D
intensity, and whether the firm belongs to the high-tech industry to predict its listing location. Since
we have three location choices, we performed separate analyses on the US and Hong Kong (column 3)
markets, and on the US and Singapore (column 4) markets. The results show that the coefficient of US
is significantly negative at the 1% level in both columns. Finally, we combined firms listed in Hong
Kong and Singapore, and used the same approach to compare the costs of capital of these firms with
those listed in the US. Column (5) shows that the coefficient of US is −0.057 and is significant at the
1% level. Column (6) shows the comparison between Hong Kong and Singapore, and we do not see a
significant difference between these two markets.
Second, in the instrumental variable method, we used the relative distance as our instrumental
variable. For example, in column (8) when we compare Hong Kong and the US, we use the log
(distance to Hong Kong) minus log (distance to New York) as our instrument. The distance between a
firm and an exchange is the distance between the capital city of its province and the city in which the
exchange is located. In column (10), when we compare the US with Hong Kong and Singapore, we
also use the log (distance to Hong Kong) minus log (distance to New York) as our instrument. The
results are similar if we use the log (distance to Singapore) minus log (distance to New York) as our
instrument. The instrumental variable approach gives similar estimations to the main results. Overall,
we found that the US-listed firms have significantly lower costs of capital than those listed in Hong
Kong and Singapore, even after controlling for the endogeneity of firms’ listing locations using two-
stage analysis. The difference in cost of capital between Hong Kong- and Singapore-listed firms does
not seem to be robustly different from zero.
In summary, the results in Table 5 show that the lower costs of capital of US-listed firms are not due
to systematic differences in firm characteristics. The results in Table 4 and Table 5 provide evidence
supporting Hypothesis 1 that US-listed Chinese firms have significantly lower costs of capital than do
similar firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Our hypothesis predicted that US-listed firms have lower costs of capital as a result of the better
institutional environment provided by the US market. If this is true, we should expect that firms facing
more asymmetric information or higher agency problems would benefit more by listing in the US
market (Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, we examined several measures of information asym-
metry and agency costs in model (11).
We chose eight variables to measure the severity of information asymmetry and agency costs faced
by firms based on the relevant literature and data availability. The results are reported in Table 7.
Seven of the eight measures are firm-specific variables, including firm size, age, idiosyncratic
volatility, leverage ratio, stock runup in the prior year, R&D intensity, and analyst coverage. Large
firms have greater analyst coverage and higher levels of institutional ownership (Zhang 2006); older
firms have more mature business and longer operating histories (Zhang 2006); firms with high levels
of idiosyncratic volatility could prevent investors from detecting managerial misbehavior and thereby
encourage managerial opportunistic behaviors (Altinkilic and Hansen 2000; Lee and Masulis 2009);
and finally, leverage reduces firms’ free cash flow and curbs the empire-building tendencies of
managers (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990).
When a firm’s future prospects are positive, managers and large shareholders have less incentive to
pursue private benefits (Lemmon and Lins 2003). This is because, when future prospects are good, the
costs of foregoing future benefits by engaging in opportunistic behavior outweigh the one-time
benefits. We used the cumulative abnormal returns from the past year for the firms (Runup) as a
proxy for its future prospects. We expected agency costs to be lower among firms with higher prior
year Runup. Firms with high R&D expenses face more uncertain outcomes, so we expected those
firms to have more severe information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev 2002). Analysts play an important
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role in information discovery and processing, so we expected firms with greater analyst coverage to
have better information environments (Mukherjee 2012).
In addition, we conjectured that managers and large shareholders engage in more opportunistic
behavior during periods of financial crisis (Lemmon and Lins 2003), so we also compared firms’ costs
of capital in financial crisis periods with costs of capital in other periods. With fewer investment
opportunities in times of financial crisis, managers and large shareholders have stronger incentives to
obtain private benefits (Lemmon and Lins 2003). If financial crisis indeed encourages more opportunistic
behavior among managers and larger shareholders, we would expect firms listed in the US, which enjoy
better institutional environments, to be less affected by financial crisis. We defined 2007 and 2008 as the
financial crisis period in question (indicated by a crisis dummy variable) and reported the corresponding
results in column (8) of Table 7.15 For simplicity of reporting, we grouped all eight variables in Table 7,
even though crisis is not a firm characteristic. Finally, to reduce the noise arising from using these
imperfect measures of information asymmetry and agency costs, we used the first principal component of
the eight variables as the proxy for information asymmetry. Using principal component analysis, we found
that the relationship between the first principle component (PC) and the eight variables was as follows:
PC ¼ 0:612Sizeþ 0:409Age 0:443IVþ 0:440Leverage 0:010Runup 0:222R D
þ0:137Followingþ 0:020Crisis
Generally speaking, the measures that are positively correlated with information asymmetry (IV and
R&D) have negative coefficients, and the measures that are negatively correlated with information
asymmetry (size, age, leverage, and following) have positive coefficients. Therefore, the higher the PC
is, the less the information asymmetry is.
The interaction between US and SGX with the variables representing firm characteristics tells us
whether firms’ listing locations have differential impacts on the costs of capital for firms with different
characteristics. We predict that if US listing reduces the cost of capital to a greater degree for firms facing
higher ex ante information asymmetry and agency costs, the coefficients of the interactions between US
and firm type should read from column (1) to column (9) as follows: positive, positive, negative, positive,
positive, negative, positive, negative, positive. The results show that when we use leverage and R&D to
group firms into different types, the coefficient of the interaction term is opposite to our prediction,
although the results are not significant. The coefficients of the interaction term using all other six measures
for age, Runup, following, and crisis were consistent with our predictions and statistically significant.
Information asymmetry and agency costs are not directly observable and each of our measures is, at best,
a noisy proxy. In the last column, we used the first principal component and interacted it with the location
dummy, and we found the coefficient is 0.008 (t = 3.23), and significant under the 1% level.
We examined the robustness of our results reported in Table 7 using a matching sample and two-stage
regression analysis. These results are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 8, respectively. To save
space, we only reported the coefficient of the interaction between US and Type. We used the same matching
procedure as in Table 6 and reported the results in Panel A. For the sake of brevity, we only reported results
with Score ≤ 0.4, but we obtain similar results with Score ≤ 0.2. In Panel B, we used the same two-stage
regression model as in Table 6, and grouped Hong Kong- and Singapore-listed firms together.
Our results are robust if we compare US-listed firms with Hong Kong- or Singapore-listed firms
separately. As can be seen, the results become stronger in terms of our prediction when we use the
matched sample and two-stage regression analysis. Specifically, only age, Runup, following, crisis, and
PC have significant coefficients when interacted with the US dummy in Table 7. When we used the
matched sample, we found almost all interaction terms, except for leverage ratio and Runup, were
significant. For two-stage regression, all were significant except for leverage ratio, which also had the
expected sign. Taking into account the measurement errors associated with each proxy, we argue that the
results in Table 7 and Table 8 strongly support our Hypothesis 2 that US-listed firms experience a more
pronounced reduction in costs of capital when they face higher information asymmetry and agency costs.
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Discussion and Conclusions
Foreign capital markets provide one of the most important sources of external equity for nonstate-
owned Chinese firms, as these firms cannot easily access the domestic equity market for institutional
reasons. This article examines the differences of three location choices—the US, Hong Kong, and
Singapore—from the perspective of cost of equity capital. Our study shows that US-listed firms have
the lowest costs of capital, when compared to those listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. We also found
that Hong Kong-listed firms have lower costs of capital than Singapore-listed firms, although this
difference disappears after we control for industry and firm characteristics. We hypothesized that the
lower cost of capital for US-listed firms is due to the better institutional environment of the US market.
Additional empirical evidence shows that US listing has a greater effect on the cost of capital of firms
facing higher information asymmetry and agency costs, further supporting our hypothesis.
Our article contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, there is currently no
consensus on the relationship between the institutional environment and cost of capital, despite
fairly extensive new research contributing to the knowledge of this issue (see, for example, Hail and
Leuz 2006; Qi, Roth, and Wald 2010). Our article provides evidence supporting the view that the
institutional environment has a first-order effect on firms’ costs of capital, based on a sample of
nonstate-owned Chinese firms listed on foreign stock markets. Since firms in our sample are from a
single country, we were able to control for the differences brought about by firms’ countries of
origin. Second, the current research on overseas listing mostly focuses on cross-listed firms, while
our sample of overseas-listed Chinese firms are all listed in a single market. The results from these
Table 8. Cross-sectional heterogeneity: Robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Type = Size Age IV Leverage Runup R&D Following Crisis PC
US*Type
Predicted sign positive positive negative positive positive negative positive negative positive
Panel A. Matching sample
US*Type 0.014* 0.008** −1.273* −0.017 0.020 −1.235* 0.009* −0.054** −0.005***
(1.78) (2.29) (−1.69) (−0.16) (1.43) (−1.89) (1.75) (−2.53) (−3.15)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.167 0.171 0.168 0.164 0.167 0.168 0.166 0.168 0.170
N 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419
Panel B. Heckman selection model
US*Type 0.010* 0.006** −0.783* 0.024 0.026** −0.376** 0.008* −0.072*** −0.002***
(1.67) (2.01) (−1.74) (0.33) (2.56) (−2.54) (1.68) (−2.76) (−4.30)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi2 364.52 367.57 364.22 362.70 370.60 362.95 364.63 371.97 307.10
N 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941
This table reports the results of matching sample analysis (Panel A) and two-stage regression analysis (Panel B). The
specifications of this table are the same as Table 7, except that we use a different sample for Panel A (only matched firm-
years), and a different method for Panel B (Heckman selection). The dependent variable is cost of capital. All control
variables are included but not reported. For the list of control variables, please see Table 4.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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cross-listed firms may not extend to our sample, and hence our study complements the existing
literature on overseas listing.
More than 600 nonstate-owned Chinese firms were listed in foreign stock markets as at the end of
2010, which is comparable to the number of nonstate-owned firms listed in the Chinese A share
market in the same time period. With the emergence of the Small and Medium Enterprise Board and
Growth Enterprise Board in the Chinese market, it has become less difficult for nonstate-owned firms
to list in the domestic market over time. Still, we expect that a sizeable number of nonstate-owned
Chinese firms will continue to choose to list publicly in foreign stock markets, and this expectation is
confirmed by the data from 2011 and 2012. One of the most important motivations for these firms to
list in overseas markets is the ability to raise external capital at lower costs. Our article identifies the
impact of the institutional environment on a firm’s listing location choice and could help Chinese firms
better select their listing locations.
We use various methods to control for the systematic differences among firms listed in different
markets, although our results could still be driven by unobservable factors that simultaneously affect
firms’ listing locations and costs of capital. We hope to acquire more detailed data and conduct a more
thorough analysis to more effectively address the endogeneity of firms’ listing locations in future studies.
We expect that firms’ foreign listing locations will affect not only their costs of capital but also
other firm behaviors, such as earnings management, related party transactions, and performance. Sun,
Tong, and Wu (2013) and Hornstein (2014) study the performance of Chinese foreign-listed firms. Liu
and Lu (2007) and Jian and Wong (2010), both using only domestically listed Chinese firms,
document the significant effect of corporate governance on earnings management and related party
transactions. We leave the matter of how foreign listing locations can affect firms’ other behaviors to
future research.
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Notes
1. In this article, we use “domestic market” interchangeably with “Chinese market”. One caveat is that some of
our sample firms may have significant international presence. For these firms, there may not be a clear definition
of “domestic market”. We use this term to be consistent with the literature.
2. This number only includes ADR Level II and ADR Level III US-listed firms which are exchange-traded
stocks. Stocks with other listing types are traded over the counter.
3. We will discuss the details of these models in Section 3.
4. Given that the US market is so much larger, not surprisingly, the ratio of total market capitalization of
Chinese firms to the total market capitalization is much lower for the US (2.3%) than the other two markets (43%
for Hong Kong and 24% for Singapore). However, the total market capitalization of Chinese firms is comparable
between the US and Hong Kong (US$0.49 trillion and US$0.38 trillion), both of which are larger than Singapore
(US$0.18 trillion). In addition, the average size of US-listed Chinese firms in our sample is much larger than that
of the other two countries and many well-known Chinese firms are listed in the US, such as Sina, Sohu, and
Shanda. These results may suggest that an average US investor is less aware of an average Hong Kong or
Singapore investor. However, what matters for cost of capital is the aggregated market-level investor awareness. It
remains unclear how these three markets differ in this dimension.
5. Detailed discussion on the implied cost of capital method can be found at Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan
(2001); Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005); Easton (2004); and Hou, Dijk, and Zhang (2012).
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6. Calculations based on the GG and OJ models are relatively simple, but for the other three models, we need
to solve nonlinear equations. Some models are quite sensitive to the input of initial value, so we tried setting initial
R equal to 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15. We delete a firm-year observation if the model never converges.
7. We may not get all 10 estimates of cost of capital for some firm-year observations due to missing data or
model nonconvergence. We only consider the samples with complete data and model convergence when
calculating average cost of capital.
8. The fourth largest market by the number of Chinese firms it attracts was the UK. Our sample includes 38
Chinese firms which were listed in the UK, and we can obtain accounting data and estimate the cost of capital
measure for 24 of these firms. We deleted these UK-listed firms from our analysis due to the small sample
problem. In addition, we find that these firms are much smaller than Chinese firms listed in the other three
markets, which makes it more difficult to draw a meaningful comparison between the UK market and the other
three markets examined in this article.
9. This definition is the same as the definition used in the industry, e.g., the definition used by Wind. Typically,
this definition identifies Chinese firms clearly.
10. Our results are robust if we remove all firms whose largest shareholder is the government, or if we remove
all firms with any reported state ownership.
11. We followed Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) when choosing control variables.
12. The index return of the listing exchanges served as proxy for market return. We used the S&P 500 Index,
the Hang Seng Index, and the Straits Times Index for US, Hong Kong, and Singapore markets, respectively.
13. We follow Loughran and Ritter (2004) in defining high-tech firms.
14. We appreciate one of our referees in suggesting the subperiod tests and the full interaction test.
15. Our results are not affected if we also include 2009 as a financial crisis year.
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